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Abstract.	Self‐selection	into	treatment	and	self‐selection	into	the	sample	are	
major	concerns	of	VAA	research	and	need	to	be	controlled	for	if	the	aim	is	to	
deduce	causal	effects	from	VAA	use	in	observational	data.	This	paper	focuses	
on	 the	 methodological	 aspects	 of	 VAA	 research	 and	 outlines	 omnipresent	
endogeneity	 issues,	 partly	 imposed	 through	 unobserved	 factors	 that	 affect	
both	whether	individuals	chose	to	use	VAAs	and	their	electoral	behavior.	We	
promote	using	Heckman	selection	models	and	apply	various	versions	of	the	
model	to	data	from	the	Swiss	electorate	and	smartvote	users	in	order	to	see	
to	 what	 extent	 selection	 biases	 interfere	 with	 the	 estimated	 effects	 of	
interest.	
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Introduction	
Whenever	we	are	 trying	 to	 figure	out	whether	VAA	use	has	an	effect	on	users,	we	are	
comparing	an	outcome	of	interest	between	voters	who	used	a	VAA	prior	to	the	elections	
versus	 those	who	 did	 not	 use	 the	 tool.	 In	 that	 sense,	 VAA	 use	 functions	 as	 treatment	
condition,	and	the	difference	between	treated	and	non‐treated	subjects	on	an	outcome	
of	interest	gives	us	the	effect	or	impact	the	VAA	has	on	individuals.	Often,	this	scenario	is	
an	ideal	which	we	cannot	approach	with	the	data	generating	process	we	employ	in	VAA	
research.		
In	terms	of	establishing	causal	relationships	between	VAA	use	and	voting	behavior,	an	
experimental	setting	would	be	the	preferred	approach.	The	main	reason	for	 this	being	
that	random	assignment	to	treatment	and	control	group	in	experiments	ensures	that	on	
average	the	difference	found	between	treated	and	control	group	can	be	solely	ascribed	
to	 having	 received	 the	 treatment	 (Morton	 and	Williams	2010).	 In	 randomly	 assigning	
participants	 to	 VAA	 use	 and	 thus	 exerting	 control	 over	 who	 uses	 the	 tool	 prior	 to	
elections	would	allow	us	to	treat	VAA	use	as	an	exogenous	predictor	for	an	outcome	of	
interest	that	we	would	like	to	compare	among	users	and	non‐users.	
Experiments	are,	however,	still	the	exception	in	VAA	research	than	the	norm	(cf.	Vassil	
2011b,	Ruusuvirta	2011).	Most	of	the	time,	data	gathered	by	VAA	researchers	stem	from	
surveys	conducted	among	the	electorate	or	specifically	among	VAA	users.	Since	random	
treatment	 assignment	 is	 not	 feasible	 in	 observational	 studies	 (Morgan	 and	 Winship	
2007:	41,	Guo	and	Fraser	2010:	3),	the	aim	is	to	absorb	as	many	confounding	variables	
to	the	relation	of	interest	as	possible	in	order	to	still	be	able	to	deduce	effects	of	interest.	
This	 endeavor	 is,	 however,	 often	 limited.	 Especially	 if	 we	 deal	 with	 questions	
surrounding	 human	 behavior,	 the	 chance	 to	 get	 to	 the	 bottom	 of	 certain	 behavioral	
patterns	by	asking	people	about	why	they	do	what	they	do	can	easily	lead	to	unreliable	
or	unobserved	measurements	(cf.	Mutz	2007:	92).	Hence,	the	problem	of	measurement	
error	 and	 omitted	 variable	 bias	 is	 omnipresent	 in	 social	 behavior	 research.	 There	 is,	
however,	 a	 further	 major	 issue	 surrounding	 the	 problem	 of	 endogeneity	 in	 VAA	
research,	one	that	 intertwines	with	measurement	error	and	omitted	variable	bias;	and	
that	 is	 selection	 bias.	 Whenever	 a	 random	 survey	 among	 a	 population	 of	 interest	 is	
conducted,	the	part	of	the	sample	in	the	category	of	VAA	users	does	not	end	up	there	by	
chance	 but	 by	 self‐selection.	 Furthermore,	 if	 we	 conduct	 surveys	 among	 VAA	 users	
themselves,	we	not	 only	deal	with	 a	 sample	of	 self‐selected	users	but,	 if	 the	 survey	 is	
non‐randomly	conducted,	with	a	sample	of	self‐selected	survey	participants.	Thus,	self‐
selection	into	treatment	as	well	as	self‐selection	into	the	sample	constitute	major	issues	
for	VAA	research	and	these	issues	need	to	be	tackled	if	we	are	trying	to	detect	effects	of	
VAA	use.		
In	this	paper,	we	outline	the	counterfactual	argument	and	the	problem	of	endogeneity	in	
VAA	research	and	discuss	possible	detours	around	 the	problem.	At	 the	same	 time,	we	
elaborate	on	the	difficulties	of	going	down	these	roads.	We	will	apply	proposed	methods	
2	
	
to	our	own	data	and	discuss	the	outcomes.	The	aim	of	outlining	these	approaches	is	to	
improve	the	future	of	VAA	research.	
	
Measuring	VAA	Effects	
Counterfactual	argument	
The	Neyman‐Rubin	counterfactual	framework	of	causality	is	at	the	heart	of	investigating	
causality	(Guo	and	Fraser	2010:	24).	The	basic	idea	is	to	create	a	scenario	where	we	can	
infer	what	would	have	happened	 to	 an	outcome	of	 interest	 if	 the	 treatment	 condition	
were	absent.	In	general,	whenever	we	are	trying	to	make	casual	claims,	we	are	trying	to	
compare	groups	and	extract	differences	that	are	only	due	to	a	change	in	a	main	variable	
of	interest.	Thus,	if	we	want	to	see	whether	VAA	use	had	an	effect	on	users,	we	ideally	
want	to	compare	two	groups	of	voters	who	only	differ	with	regard	to	whether	they	had	
used	 the	 VAA	 for	 their	 electoral	 decision	making.	 Groups	 should	 thus	 be,	 on	 average,	
identical	on	all	other	observed	and	unobserved	characteristics.	Only	then	can	we	deduce	
changes	 to	 a	 specific	 cause	 and	 effect	 scenario.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 experiments,	 the	
random	 assignment	 of	 individuals	 to	 groups	 should	 ensure	 such	 a	 scenario.	 All	
individuals	 have	 the	 same	 probability	 of	 being	 assigned	 to	 either	 the	 control	 or	
treatment	 group.	 Given	 a	 large	 enough	 sample,	 the	 groups	 should	 on	 average	 be	
interchangeable	with	regards	to	their	characteristics.		This	condition	ensures	the	central	
component	of	experimental	work;	we	create	a	scenario	of	counterfactuals.		
Counterfactuals	work	with	 the	 “potential	 outcomes	 framework”	 (Morgan	and	Winship	
2007:	 4),	 where	 “what‐if”	 scenarios	 build	 the	 baseline	 for	 making	 causal	 claims.	
Scenarios	are	created	where	each	individual	in	the	population	has	the	same	chance	for	a	
potential	outcome,	but	we	only	get	to	observe	the	individual	in	one	treatment	condition.	
Given	 that	 groups	 only	 differ	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 treatment	 condition	 in	 randomized	
settings,	we	can	assume	that	we	observe	in	the	control	group	what	the	treatment	group	
would	have	done	had	it	not	been	given	the	treatment	and	vice	versa.	Hence,	treatment	
and	control	group	are	seen	as	interchangeable.	Although	this	assumption	only	holds	on	
the	 aggregate	 level	 (groups),	 the	 counterfactual	 framework	 allows	 detecting	 casual	
effects	(Guo	and	Fraser	2010:	25).	In	randomly	assigned	control	and	treatment	groups,	
the	 causal	 effect	 is	 the	 difference	 in	 the	means	 of	 an	 outcome	 of	 interest	 for	 the	 two	
groups,	 and	 the	 reliability	 of	 this	 difference	 can	 then	 be	 statistically	 estimated	
(Antonakis	and	Lalive	2004).		
The	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 on	 an	 outcome	 of	 interest	 is	 the	 average	
treatment	effect	in	the	Neyman‐Rubin	counterfactual	framework.	A	condition	that	has	to	
be	 met	 for	 consistently	 estimating	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect	 is	 the	 ignorable	
treatment	 assignment	 assumption	 (Rosenbaum	and	Rubin	1983,	Morgan	 and	Winship	
2007:	41).	As	Guo	and	Fraser	(2010:	31)	put	it,	“the	assumption	says	that	conditional	on	
covariates	 X,	 the	 assignment	 of	 study	 participants	 to	 binary	 treatment	 conditions	 is	
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independent	of	 the	outcome	of	nontreatment	and	 the	outcome	of	 treatment”.	 In	other	
words,	 if	we	 hold	 all	 observed	 confounders	 constant,	we	 assume	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	
interest	 is	 independent	of	 the	 treatment	assignment	mechanism	(Morgan	and	Winship	
2007:	40).	Assigning	participants	randomly	to	the	treatment	or	non‐treatment	condition	
in	 classical	 experiments	 ensures	 that	 the	 condition	 is	 statistically	 independent	 of	 all	
other	variables,	confounders	as	well	as	outcomes.	The	important	point	here	is	that	the	
average	 treatment	effect	only	holds	 if	we	can	assume	that	 there	 is	no	selection	bias	 in	
treatment	 assignment.	 In	 other	words,	 as	 soon	 as	we	 have	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 the	
treatment	 variable	 is	 related	 through	 unobservables	 to	 the	 outcome	 variable,	 the	
independence	of	treatment	assignment	with	regard	to	the	outcome	of	interest	no	longer	
holds	(Morton	and	Williams	2010:	113).			
The	impossibility	of	randomly	assigning	survey	participants	to	treatment	conditions	and	
the	 likelihood	 for	 unobserved	 confounders	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 challenge	 that	
observational	 studies	 face	 when	 trying	 to	 detect	 causal	 effects.	 Through	 the	 lack	 of	
control	over	the	treatment	condition,	the	independence	assumption	is	hard	to	maintain	
and	 the	 way	 individuals	 end	 up	 in	 the	 treatment	 condition	 needs	 to	 be	 investigated	
(Morgan	 and	 Winship	 2007:	 41).	 In	 VAA	 research,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 tool	 constitutes	 a	
treatment	condition	that	is	used	as	an	explanatory	variable	for	changes	or	differences	in	
voting	 behavior,	 political	 preferences	 or	 political	 attitudes.	 If	 the	 data	 on	 VAA	 use	 is	
gathered	 through	 surveys,	 it	 is	 the	 individual	 itself	 rather	 than	 the	 researcher	 who	
selects	 whether	 the	 treatment	 condition	 applies	 or	 not	 (Gelman	 and	 Hill	 2007:	 181).	
This	 explicit	 choice	 of	 whether	 to	 use	 a	 VAA	 or	 not	 is	 a	 non‐random	 process,	
systematically	distinguishing	VAA	users	from	non‐users.	It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	
voters	with	 a	 high	 interest	 in	 politics	 and	 a	 high	motivation	 to	 engage	 in	 politics,	 for	
example,	 are	more	 receptive	 towards	 using	VAAs	 as	 a	 source	 of	 information	 for	 their	
electoral	choices	whereas	disengaged	and	uninterested	citizens	are	less	likely	to	take	the	
time	 and	 deal	 with	 questions	 surrounding	 their	 political	 positions	 and	 preferences.	
Hence,	 VAA	 user	 can	 be	 assumed	 to	 differ	 substantially	 from	 non‐users	 and	 this	
difference	needs	to	be	accounted	for	when	estimating	the	potential	effects	of	such	tools	
on	voters.		
So	far,	the	situation	at	hand	does	not	differ	from	a	normal	regression	analysis	where	the	
outcome	 of	 interest	 is	 regressed	 on	 the	 treatment	 condition	 and	 a	 set	 of	 observed	
control	variables.	However,	as	mentioned	before,	the	situation	changes	when	we	either	
cannot	or	do	not	observe	all	possible	covariates	that	predict	both	the	treatment	and	the	
outcome	of	 interest	 (Gelman	 and	Hill	 2007:	 215).	Moreover,	 some	observed	 variables	
may	 not	 have	 been	measured	 accurately.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 random	 sample	 among	 the	
electorate	where	we	know	whether	participants	used	a	VAA	prior	 to	 the	elections,	we	
have	to	investigate	how	participants	end	up	choosing	to	be	part	of	the	“treated”	group	
(those	who	used	a	VAA)	versus	being	part	of	the	nontreated	group	(those	who	did	not	
use	 a	 VAA)	 and	 whether	 this	 is	 potentially	 associated	 with	 an	 outcome	 of	 interest.	
Hence,	the	self‐selection	into	treatment	has	to	be	accounted	for	in	order	to	ensure	that	
the	estimates	we	retrieve	are	unbiased.	Since	we	can	only	make	assumptions	about	the	
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underlying	selection	mechanism	that	makes	people	choose	to	use	VAAs,	we	might	most	
likely	 not	 be	 able	 to	 observe	 and	 accurately	measure	 all	 components	 that	 are	 at	 play.	
Think	of	personality	traits	or	cognitive	abilities	that	might	both	incline	people	to	make	
use	of	VAAs	and	also	the	choices	they	make	at	elections	or	the	attitudes	they	have	about	
politics.	 If	 this	 hypothetical	 scenario	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 true,	 we	 have	 a	 situation	where	
unobserved	variables	affect	both	 the	 treatment	condition	and	 the	outcome	of	 interest,	
which	leads	us	back	to	the	point	where	ignorability	of	treatment	assignment	is	violated.	
In	this	case,	the	effect	we	measure	from	regressing	or	predicting	an	outcome	of	interest	
from	the	treatment	condition	and	observable	confounders	will	be	biased	(Antonakis	et	
al.	2010).	The	logic	behind	this	is	the	same	as	dealing	with	endogeneity	in	ordinary	least	
squares	(OLS)	regressions.		
	
Endogeneity	in	VAA	Research	
If	we	know	that	our	main	variable	of	interest	is	endogenous	rather	than	exogenous,	we	
need	to	apply	appropriate	measures	to	correct	for	this	problem,	otherwise	the	effects	we	
find	are	not	consistent.	The	importance	of	consistency	for	casual	inference	is	of	outmost	
importance,	 without	 it	 the	 relationship	 between	 two	 variables	 will	 never	 reflect	 the	
(true)	causal	relation.	Consistency	of	estimates	basically	means	that	with	an	increasing	
sample	 size,	 the	estimate	 converges	 to	 the	 true	population	estimate.	Thus,	we	achieve	
certain	accuracy	in	the	estimation	process.	Efficiency,	on	the	other	hand,	is	also	a	desired	
aspect	of	estimation,	where	estimates	gain	in	precision	due	to	smaller	estimations	of	the	
variance	of	 parameters.	 In	 general,	we	prefer	 consistent	 estimates	 over	 efficient	ones,	
since	there	is	no	scientific	gain	from	shooting	over	and	over	at	the	same	point	but	in	the	
wrong	direction.	Hence,	efficient	estimates	are	worthless	if	they	are	biased.		
In	 observational	 data,	 treatment	 assignment	 is	 not	 ignorable	 and	 using	 the	 treatment	
condition	as	 a	dummy	variable	might	 easily	 lead	 to	 endogeneity	bias	 (Guo	and	Fraser	
2010:	 32).	 Through	 the	 nonignorable	 treatment	 assignment,	 factors	 underlying	 the	
selection	might	cause	the	dummy	variable	in	the	model	to	correlate	with	the	error	term	
of	the	equation,	which	leaves	us	with	biased	and	inconsistent	results.	If	VAA	use	is	seen	
as	 the	 treatment	 condition,	we	 only	 observe	whether	 a	 particular	 individual	 used	 the	
tool,	 but	 what	 we	 do	 not	 observe	 is	 the	 underlying	 utility	 function	 that	 leads	 an	
individual	to	the	choice	of	using	the	VAA.	For	every	observed	individual,	there	is	a	cutoff	
value,	 a	 tipping	 point	 where	 the	 decision	 is	 made	 to	 go	 one	 way	 or	 the	 other.	 Some	
aspects	 of	 that	 utility	 function	 can	 be	 observed	 and	 controlled	 for.	 But	 naturally,	 it	 is	
often	 impossible	 to	 observe	 them	 all	 since	 they	 are	 either	 not	 measured,	 cannot	 be	
measured	or	are	simply	unknown.	It	is	exactly	this	dilemma	of	modeling	causal	relations	
that	 led	Heckman	(1978,	1979)	to	the	development	of	the	sample	selection	model	and	
Maddala	(1983)	to	the	treatment	effect	model	(Guo	and	Fraser	2010:	32).	Both	models	
tackle	the	endogeneity	bias	and	provide	statistical	means	to	correct	for	them.				
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In	the	following	section,	we	outline	the	workings	of	both	the	Heckman	sample	selection	
model	and	the	treatment	effect	model	and	apply	these	models	to	data	we	have	collected	
in	Switzerland	among	smartvote	users	and	data	that	has	been	gathered	from	the	Swiss	
electorate	for	the	2007	Swiss	federal	elections.	
	
Heckman	Models	
	 Heckman	sample	selection	model	
The	general	research	motivation	is	to	collect	data	from	a	subsample	of	a	population	of	
interest	and	draw	inferences	about	the	underlying	population	from	the	sample	collected.	
As	 soon	 as	 the	 data	 collection	 process	 prevents	 us	 from	 obtaining	 a	 subsample	 from	
which	we	can	infer	to	the	population	of	interest,	cautionary	measures	need	to	be	taken.	
Sample	 selection	 or	 incidental	 truncation	 occurs	 when	 the	 sample	 data	 at	 hand	 is	
nonrandomly	selected	(Greene	2008:	883)	and	the	challenge	 then	 lies	 in	modeling	 the	
sample	selection	process	in	order	to	make	valid	claims	with	regard	to	the	population	of	
interest.		
A	 sample	 selection	model	 is	 characterized	by	 the	 fact	 that	we	observe	 the	outcome	of	
interest	only	for	those	participants	who	have	self‐selected	themselves	into	the	sample.	If	
we	conduct	a	survey	among	VAA	users,	we	only	observe	the	voting	behavior	(i.e.	swing	
voting)	among	users	who	first	of	all	have	chosen	to	make	use	of	the	tool	and	second	of	
all	have	chosen	to	participate	in	the	survey.	These	selection	processes	do	very	likely	not	
happen	randomly	but	follow	a	systematic	path,	and	it	 is	exactly	this	path	towards	self‐
selection	that	we	need	to	take	into	account	when	analyzing	the	data.		
The	problem	associated	with	sample	selection	goes	back	to	the	issues	discussed	in	the	
absence	of	 ignorable	 treatment	 assignment.	 If	we	want	 to	measure	an	effect	based	on	
two	 groups	 of	 individuals	 and	 these	 groups	 differ	 systematically	 from	 one	 another,	
interchangeability	of	 these	 individuals	 is	no	 longer	granted	and	a	comparison	of	 these	
two	 groups	 likely	 yield	 inconsistent	 estimates.	 The	 only	 way	 to	 retrieve	 consistent	
estimates	given	these	two	groups	is	to	model	the	selection	mechanisms	that	 led	to	the	
systematic	difference	of	 the	 two	groups	 in	 the	 first	place.	 James	Heckman	(1979)	won	
the	Nobel	Prize	in	Economics	for	his	work	on	selection	models	in	2000,	where	he	found	
a	 way	 to	 control	 for	 the	 unobserved	 heterogeneity	 due	 to	 selection	 in	 predicting	
variables	of	interest.	Heckman’s	sample	selection	model	was	a	pioneering	approach	for	
correcting	selection	biases	(Guo	and	Fraser	2010:	85).		
The	 logic	 behind	 the	 sample	 selection	 model	 is	 to	 estimate	 the	 probability	 of	 a	
participant	to	be	in	the	sample	at	hand	and	then	use	that	information	for	estimating	the	
outcome	of	interest.	The	reason	to	do	this	is	that	we	assume	that	factors	leading	to	the	
choice	of	being	part	of	the	sample	or	being	part	of	the	treatment	condition	in	the	sample	
are	 unobserved	 and	 correlate	with	 our	 outcome	 of	 interest.	 In	 following	Morgan	 and	
Winship	(2007:	185),	 the	estimation	procedure	can	be	described	in	the	 following	way.	
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We	 specify	 two	 equations,	 a	 selection	 equation	 where	 mechanisms	 determining	 the	
selection	 process	 are	 modeled	 and	 an	 outcome	 equation	 where	 mechanisms	
determining	 an	 outcome	 variable	 of	 interest	 are	 modeled.	 In	 the	 selection	 equation,	
participation	in	the	sample	or	treatment	condition	is	specified	based	on	some	observed	
variables	 that	determine	 the	selection	plus	an	error	 term	that	 includes	all	unobserved	
selection	 factors.	 In	 predicting	 the	 selection	 condition,	 the	 dummy	 variable	 indicating	
whether	 participants	 have	 self‐selected	 themselves	 into	 the	 sample	 or	 treatment	 is	
treated	as	an	endogenous	latent	variable,	and	its	expected	value	is	estimated	based	on	
both	observed	and	unobserved	factors.	Since	we	do	not	observe	the	unobserved	factors,	
their	expected	values	are	calculated1	and	then	used	as	a	control	variable	for	estimating	
consistent	effects	 in	the	outcome	equation	of	 interest.	Guo	and	Fraser	(2010:	96)	label	
the	 error	 term	 of	 the	 selection	 equation	 as	 “a	 case	 of	 unobserved	 heterogeneity	
determining	 selection	 bias	 (which)	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 true	 omitted‐variable	 problem	 and	
creatively	 taken	 into	 consideration	when	 estimating	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 (outcome)	
equation”.	 This	 procedure	 is	 Heckman’s	 lambda	method	 for	 correcting	 selection	 bias,	
where	 the	 inverse	 Mill’s	 ratio	 is	 estimated	 in	 the	 selection	 equation	 based	 on	 the	
probability	 of	 choosing	 the	 treatment,	 including	 all	 unobserved	 characteristics.	 In	
including	 the	 inverse	 Mill’s	 ratio	 in	 estimating	 the	 outcome	 equation	 of	 interest,	 we	
proceed	 as	 taking	 an	 omitted	 variable	 into	 account	 (Wooldrige	 2002:	 567)	 which	
removes	variance	in	the	error	term	that	is	due	to	selection	(Antonakis	et	al.	2010:	1110)	
and	thus	ensures	that	the	errors	of	the	selection	equation	and	the	outcome	equation	no	
longer	correlate.		
To	apply	 these	 theoretical	elaborations	on	VAA	research,	 consider	 the	 following	Swiss	
specific	scenario.	We	conducted	a	survey	among	smartvote	users	during	the	2007	Swiss	
federal	 election	 campaign.	After	 receiving	a	voting	 recommendation	 from	 the	website,	
users	where	 asked	whether	 they	would	participate	 in	 our	 survey.	Given	 that	data,	we	
would	now	like	to	find	out	whether	the	voting	recommendation	had	an	effect	on	users’	
voting	behavior.	In	modeling	such	an	effect,	we	need	to	account	for	the	fact	that	the	data	
at	hand	constitutes	a	self‐selected,	non‐random	sample.	Hence,	in	estimating	the	effect	of	
interest	 we	 have	 to	 take	 the	 selection	 bias	 inherent	 in	 our	 data	 into	 account.	 The	
selection	we	face	here	is	twofold:	first,	individuals	self‐select	themselves	into	becoming	
smartvote	users	out	of	the	total	population	of	voters	(self‐selection	into	treatment)	and	
then	self‐select	themselves	into	becoming	a	participant	in	the	survey	(self‐selection	into	
the	sample).	Chances	are	that	those	enthusiastic	about	the	opportunities	offered	by	such	
tools	and	with	a	general	openness	towards	new	information	are	first	of	all	prone	to	use	
the	tool	and	might	also	have	a	higher	tendency	to	answer	the	survey	(cf.	Vassil	2011a).	
Hence,	we	might	end	up	with	a	sample	of	highly	enthusiastic	and	convinced	smartvote	
users	who	report	stronger	effects	of	the	tool	on	their	voting	behavior	than	if	we	had	had	
the	 chance	 to	 survey	 a	 representative	 sample	 of	 smartvote	 users.	 The	 likelihood	 for	
																																																								
	
1	 To	 do	 so,	 the	 strong	 assumption	 of	 normal	 distribution	 of	 the	 unobserved	 factors	 needs	 to	 be	made	
(Morgan	and	Winship	2007:	185).		
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overreporting	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 tool	 on	 a	 user’s	 behavior	 is	 therefore	 great.	 In	 using	 a	
Heckman	sample	selection	model,	the	aim	is	to	control	for	the	selection	mechanism	that	
might	end	up	aggravating	effects	in	the	sample	compared	to	the	actual	population.		
In	 addressing	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 voting	 recommendation	 had	 an	 impact	 on	
users’	 voting	 behavior,	we	 are	 interested	 to	 see	whether	 those	 affected	by	 the	 tool	 in	
their	vote	choice	ended	up	voting	for	a	different	party	at	the	2007	election	compared	to	
the	last	one.	Since	we	only	observe	a	change	in	vote	choice	(dependent	variable	of	our	
outcome	 equation)	 among	 the	 self‐selected	 sample	 of	 smartvote	 users,	 we	 need	 to	
specify	the	selection	equation.	The	tricky	part	is	that	we	can	only	assume	the	selection	
mechanism	at	play,	and	due	to	the	data	structure	have	to	make	additional	assumptions	
with	regard	to	the	underlying	self‐selection	process.	Since	we	assume	that	the	effect	of	
smartvote	 use	 is	 overreported	 in	 our	 sample,	 we	 want	 to	 control	 for	 the	 specific	
differences	 between	 smartvote	 users	 and	 non‐users	 in	 the	 outcome	 equation.	 The	
rationale	 behind	 this	 is	 that	 we	 assume	 that	 the	 self‐selection	 mechanisms	 into	 the	
treatment	and	into	the	sample	are	similar.		
How	do	we	go	about	modeling	the	probability	of	becoming	a	smartvote	users	versus	not	
becoming	 a	 smartvote	 user	 in	 a	 sample	 consisting	 only	 of	 smartvote	 users?	 The	
advantage	 at	 hand	 is	 that	 we	 have	 a	 separate	 randomly	 sampled	 survey	 that	 was	
conducted	among	the	Swiss	electorate	after	the	elections	and	which	asked	participants	
whether	they	have	used	smartvote	prior	to	the	elections.	Since	a	lot	of	question	items	in	
the	Swiss	electorate	survey	are	identical	to	the	questions	items	in	the	smartvote	survey,	
we	 can	 append	 the	 two	 data	 sets.	 First,	we	 dropped	 all	 smartvote	 users	 in	 the	 Swiss	
electorate	survey	in	order	to	get	a	sample	of	non‐users.	This	non‐user	sample	was	then	
appended	 to	 the	 smartvote	 survey,	 creating	 a	 data	 set	 where	 we	 can	 distinguish	
between	users	and	non‐users	based	on	respective	characteristics.		
The	 estimation	 procedure	 takes	 the	 following	 steps.	 First,	 we	 specify	 the	 selection	
equation	 which	 contains	 a	 vector	 of	 factors	 known	 and	 observed	 to	 influence	 the	
probability	of	becoming	a	 smartvote	user	as	well	 as	an	error	 term	which	contains	 the	
unmeasured	 characteristics	 in	 the	 selection	 equation.	 Since	 we	 assume	 that	 exactly	
those	 unmeasured	 characteristics	 of	 voters	 both	 determine	 the	 probability	 for	
smartvote	 use	 as	 well	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 interest	 (e.g.	 openness	 to	 persuasion,	
availability	to	incorporate	new	information	in	decision	making	etc.),	the	error	terms	of	
the	 selection	 equation	 and	 the	 outcome	 equation	 are	most	 likely	 correlated.	 If	 this	 is	
indeed	 the	 case,	 applying	a	Heckman	sample	 selection	model	will	 take	 the	 correlation	
into	account	and	provide	consistent	estimates	 in	 the	outcome	equation.	Therefore,	 the	
aim	is	to	model	our	outcome	equation	(with	the	effect	of	interest)	while	controlling	for	
the	selection	mechanism	(Vassil	2011a:	6).	If	we	were	to	skip	the	selection	equation	and	
the	error	terms	are	correlated,	 the	estimates	 in	the	outcome	regression	will	be	biased.	
Important	to	note	here	is	that	if	the	unmeasured	characteristics	influencing	the	selection	
equation	do	not	correlate	with	the	unmeasured	characteristics	of	the	outcome	equation,	
the	selection	can	be	left	out	and	we	can	still	obtain	consistent	estimates	(Kennedy	2007:	
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286).	Hence,	theoretical	argumentation	and	correct	model	specifications	are	at	the	heart	
of	such	estimation	procedures.	
In	the	following	example,	we	illustrate	both	estimates	obtained	from	an	ordinary	probit	
regression	 and	 a	 Heckman	 sample	 selection	model.	 The	 outcome	 of	 interest	 is	 swing	
voting,	a	binary	variable	that	requires	a	bivariate	probit	model2	since	we	have	a	probit	
model	in	the	selection	equation	and	a	probit	model	in	the	outcome	equation.	Our	main	
effect	of	interest	is	whether	a	user	was	affected	by	the	voting	recommendation	in	his	or	
her	 vote	 choice,	 while	 we	 control	 for	 factors	 such	 as	 being	 surprised	 by	 the	 voting	
recommendation,	 multiple	 vote	 propensities,	 party	 attachment,	 political	 ideology,	
number	of	candidates	running	per	seat	as	well	as	age	(for	variable	details,	see	Appendix	
A).	 In	 the	 selection	 equation,	 we	 treat	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	 smartvote	 use	 as	 an	
endogenous	dependent	variable	and	a	function	of	the	following	observed	variables:	age,	
education,	 income,	gender,	multiple	vote	propensities	and	visiting	political	homepages	
of	 candidates	 and	 parties	 prior	 to	 the	 elections.	 From	 the	 representative	 Swiss	
electorate	 study	SELECTS3,	we	know	 that	 smartvote	users	 are	generally	 younger,	well	
educated,	with	high	incomes	and	male.	At	the	same	time,	visiting	political	websites	is	a	
proxy	for	online	affinity	and	for	engaging	in	and	being	interested	in	gathering	political	
information	online.	Multiple	 vote	propensities	 are	 an	 indicator	 for	 openness	 to	 a	 vote	
change	 or	 indecision	 with	 regard	 to	 one’s	 vote	 choice.	 Except	 age	 and	 multiple	 vote	
propensities,	 the	 other	 variables	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	 outcome	 equation	 since	 they	
can	be	argued	not	to	be	directly	 linked	to	the	outcome	variable	of	interest	but	directly	
linked	to	the	likelihood	for	smartvote	use	(called	the	exclusion	restriction).	In	applying	a	
Heckman	 sample	 selection	model	 we	 assume	 that	 unobserved	 factors	 that	 determine	
whether	a	voter	uses	smartvote	and	ends	up	 in	the	survey	sample	are	correlated	with	
unobserved	 factors	 that	 are	 associated	 to	 swing	 voting.	 Given	 our	 data	 structure,	 the	
selection	equation	is	fully	observed,	while	we	only	have	a	selected	(censored)	sample	for	
the	outcome	equation.	Table	A	 illustrates	 the	direct	marginal	effects	of	 the	coefficients	
for	both	a	regular	probit	model	and	a	probit	model	with	sample	selection.	The	variables	
listed	with	empty	cells	have	been	exclusively	used	to	estimate	the	selection	equation.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
	
2	Using	STATA’s	command	heckprob	
3	http://www2.unil.ch/selects/?lang=en		
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Table	A.	The	effect	of	the	smartvote	voting	recommendation	on	vote	choice	–	Estimation	
with	and	without	selection4	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
	
4	For	visual	reasons,	the	14	fixed	effects	for	the	number	of	candidates	running	per	seat	are	excluded	from	
the	table.		
Swing	voting	
Probit	model Probit	model	with	
Heckman	sample	
selection	
	 	
affected	by	voting	recommendation 0.09*** 0.08***	
	 (‐0.02) (‐0.02)	
rather	not	surprising	 0.04 0.03	
	 (‐0.02) (‐0.02)	
rather	surprising	 0.05* 0.05	
	 (‐0.03) (‐0.03)	
very	surprising 0.18*** 0.15**	
	 (‐0.06) (‐0.07)	
multiple	vote	propensities	 0.06** 0.04	
	 (‐0.02) (‐0.03)	
party	attachment	 ‐0.11*** ‐0.18***	
	 (‐0.02) (‐0.02)	
left	 0.05** 0.06**	
	 (‐0.02) (‐0.02)	
center	 0.14*** 0.13***	
	 (‐0.03) (‐0.03)	
age	 ‐0.003*** ‐0.003***	
	 (‐0.001) (‐0.001)	
gender	 ‐	
	 	
education	 ‐	
	 	
income	 ‐	
	 	
visited	homepage	 ‐	
	 	
Observations	 2,678 5,895	
Log	likelihood	 ‐1696 ‐3943	
ρ	
	
‐0.12		
(chi2(1)=2.42,	p>0.1)	
Average	direct	marginal	effects	(discrete	
change	for	dummy	variables)	
	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 	
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In	 this	example,	 the	ρ	(rho)	of	 the	Heckman	sample	selection	model	 is	non‐significant,	
indicating	that	we	cannot	reject	that	the	presumed	correlation	between	the	error	terms	
of	our	specified	equations	 is	 in	 fact	zero	–	hence,	 in	 this	case,	 if	we	correctly	specified	
our	model,	it	would	be	sufficient	to	retrieve	the	estimates	from	the	regular	probit	model.	
The	 effects	 are	 practically	 the	 same	 in	 the	 two	 models,	 thus	 we	 do	 not	 observe	 any	
change	in	the	predicted	estimates	due	to	sample	selection	bias.	At	this	point,	we	could	
speculate	that	we	have	observed	and	controlled	for	all	important	factors	that	are	linked	
to	 the	 self‐selection	 process	 or	 that	 our	 assumption	 that	 the	 underlying	 selection	
process	between	selection	into	treatment	and	selection	into	the	sample	is	equivalent	is	
not	adequate.	The	answer	rests	on	the	suitability	of	the	theory	we	use	for	specifying	our	
model.	
With	regard	to	the	outcome,	our	model	indicates	that	those	affected	in	their	vote	choice	
by	the	voting	recommendation	had	a	significantly	higher	probability	to	change	their	vote	
choice	 compared	 to	 those	who	were	not	 affected	by	 the	 tool.	 Those	users	who	 stated	
that	 they	were	rather	surprised	or	very	surprised	by	 the	voting	recommendation	 they	
received	compared	to	those	who	were	not	surprised	at	all	also	had	a	significantly	higher	
probability	for	changing	their	vote	choice.	Younger	voters	and	those	without	a	specific	
party	 attachment	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 change	 their	 party	 choice	 between	 the	 two	
elections,	and	voters	with	a	political	ideology	on	the	left	and	in	the	center,	compared	to	
those	on	the	right,	were	also	more	likely	to	switch	their	vote.	Multiple	vote	propensities	
significantly	 increase	 the	 chance	 for	 swing	 voting,	 however,	 the	 effect	 was	 non‐
significant	in	the	Heckman	sample	selection	where	multiple	vote	propensities	were	part	
of	the	selection	equation.		
In	 specifying	 this	model,	 we	 relied	 on	 several	 assumptions	 in	modeling	 the	 selection	
equation.	Favorably,	we	would	have	a	bunch	of	variables	that	are	only	associated	with	
smartvote	use	and	completely	unassociated	with	the	outcome	of	interest.	If	we	find	such	
variables,	 then	 selection	models	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 instrumental	 variables	models,	
where	exogenous	variables	are	used	to	predict	the	selection	but	not	the	outcome	(more	
on	IV	estimation	in	the	next	section).		
	
Heckman	treatment	effect	model	
Heckman	 sample	 selection	 models	 differ	 from	 Heckman	 treatment	 effect	 models	
(Maddala	1983)	mainly	in	two	ways:	first	in	how	the	sample	at	hand	is	structured	and	
second	 in	 the	 estimation	 procedure.	 In	 sample	 selection	models,	we	 only	 observe	 the	
outcome	variable	of	 interest	 for	 those	exposed	 to	 the	 treatment	whereas	 in	 treatment	
effect	models	 we	 observe	 the	 outcome	 variable	 for	 both	 the	 treated	 and	 non‐treated	
participants.	 This	 in	 turn	 changes	 the	 selection	 bias	 estimation	 procedure.	 In	 case	 of	
treatment	 effects	 models,	 the	 treatment	 dummy	 is,	 besides	 the	 inverse	 Mills	 ratio,	
included	 in	 the	 second	 stage	 equation	 (Guo	 and	 Fraser	 2010:	 97).	 The	main	 issue	 in	
treatment	effect	models	is	that	the	assignment	to	the	treatment	condition	is	non‐random	
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(and	 thus	 endogenous)	 and	 possibly	 related	 to	 the	 outcome	 –	 hence,	 as	 in	 sample	
selection	 models,	 we	 assume	 a	 possible	 correlation	 between	 the	 error	 terms	 in	 the	
selection	equation	and	the	outcome	equation.	
The	aim	of	the	treatment	effect	model	is	to	approximate	a	randomized	experiment	with	
observational	 data.	 A	 (mostly)	 binary	 treatment	 condition	 is	 specified	 and	 the	model	
sets	out	to	overcome	the	fact	that	the	treatment	condition	is	not	randomly	assigned	by	
the	researcher	but	rather	participants	self‐select	themselves	into	a	treatment	condition.	
In	 our	 case,	 whenever	 we	 survey	 a	 (random)	 population	 of	 the	 electorate,	 voters	
themselves	chose	to	self‐select	themselves	into	our	treatment	condition	of	interest,	VAA	
use.	 In	 treatment	 effects	 model,	 we	 measure	 the	 outcome	 for	 both	 treated	 and	
nontreated	groups,	the	only	difference	is	that	we	have	to	account	for	the	selection	bias	
that	preceded	the	treatment	condition.	In	econometric	terms,	we	need	to	account	for	the	
fact	that	the	binary	treatment	variable	is	not	exogenous	but	rather	endogenous	–	again,	
the	situation	where	the	treatment	variable	possibly	correlates	with	the	error	term	of	the	
equation.	 As	 in	 the	 Heckman	 sample	 selection	 model,	 the	 selection	 equation	 into	
treatment	is	based	on	a	latent	model,	where	we	only	observe	whether	individuals	have	
used	smartvote	or	not.		
The	problem	of	self‐selection	is	inherent	in	observational	data	on	VAA	users,	therefore	
the	 aim	 should	 be	 to	 model	 the	 self‐selection	 into	 treatment	 whenever	 we	 compare	
users	to	non‐users.	The	challenge	lies	in	finding	appropriate	instruments	that	do	predict	
participation	in	the	treatment	or	control	group	and	do	explain	the	selection	mechanism.	
As	an	example	here,	we	are	only	interested	whether	voters	who	used	smartvote	prior	to	
the	 elections	 have	 a	 higher	 probability	 to	 swing	 vote	 than	 non‐users.	 In	 this	 case,	we	
view	smartvote	use	as	a	treatment	condition,	and	we	assume	that	becoming	a	smartvote	
users	 does	 not	 happen	 randomly	 among	 the	 electorate,	 there	 is	 an	 explicit	 selection	
process	that	causes	individuals	to	use	the	tool.	Therefore,	in	a	treatment	effects	model,	
we	 first	 specify	 a	 selection	 equation	 that	 predicts	 the	 treatment	 condition	 and	 then	
specify	an	outcome	equation	where	the	treatment	condition	is	included	as	a	variable	in	
the	model	 (since	we	observe	 the	outcome	of	 interest	 for	both	treated	and	non‐treated	
groups).		
The	 dataset	we	 use	 for	 the	 treatment	 effect	model	 consists	 of	 Swiss	 voters	 and	 their	
electoral	 behavior	 and	 preferences	 and	 among	 which	 we	 can	 distinguish	 between	
smartvote	 users	 and	 non‐users.	 Since	 the	 outcome	 of	 interest	 is	 a	 binary	 variable	
indicating	 swing	 voting,	 we	 again	 specify	 a	 bivariate	 probit	 model5.	 In	 predicting	 an	
effect	of	smartvote	use	on	swing	voting,	we	control	 for	variables	such	as	multiple	vote	
propensities,	party	attachment,	political	ideology	and	age.	In	the	selection	equation,	we	
predict	 smartvote	 use	 as	 a	 function	 of	 age,	 income,	 education,	 gender,	 multiple	 vote	
propensities	and	having	visited	political	websites	prior	 to	 the	elections.	 In	 this	model,	
																																																								
	
5	Using	STATA’s	command	biprobit	or	biprobittreat.	
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the	 variable	 smartvote	 is	 the	 binary	 endogenous	 treatment	 variable	 upon	 which	 the	
selection	process	is	modeled.	The	following	table	(see	Table	B)	gives	the	results	for	the	
outcome	 equation	 of	 the	 ordinary	 probit	 model	 and	 the	 Heckman	 treatment	 effect	
model:	
Table	B.	 The	 effect	 of	 smartvote	 use	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 swing	 voting	 –	 a	 bivariate	
treatment	effect	model	
Probit	model Bivariate	probit	
treatment	effect	
model	
swing	voting	 	
	
used	smartvote	 0.39*** 0.64***	
(0.05) (0.12)	
multiple	vote	propensities	 0.28*** 0.21***	
(0.05) (0.06)	
party	attachment	 ‐0.39*** ‐0.39***	
(0.04) (0.04)	
left	 ‐0.16*** ‐0.14***	
(0.05) (0.05)	
right	 ‐0.22*** ‐0.21***	
(0.06) (0.06)	
age	 ‐0.01*** ‐0.003*	
(0.001) (0.002)	
education		 ‐	
income	 ‐	
gender	 ‐	
homepage	 ‐	
Constant	 ‐0.28*** ‐0.53***	
(0.09) (0.15)	
	
Observations	 4463 4,067	
Log	likelihood	 ‐2603 ‐4089	
ρ	 ‐.18**	(chi2(1)=5.1	p<.05)	
Notes:	education	and	income	are	coded	as	dummy	categories	with	a	reference	group
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 	
	
The	coefficients	reported	here	are	the	probit	coefficients,	thus	we	can	only	interpret	the	
sign	and	significance	but	not	the	magnitude	of	the	effect.	The	selection	equation	is	not	
reported	 here,	 but	 smartvote	 use	was	 predicted	 from	 age,	 education,	 income,	 gender,	
multiple	vote	propensities	and	visiting	websites	of	politicians.	Rho	(ρ)	 is	the	estimated	
correlation	 between	 the	 error	 terms	 of	 both	 equations	 and	 significant	 in	 this	 model,	
pointing	 to	 a	 selection	 bias	 in	 our	model.	 A	 negative	 rho	 indicates	 that	 the	 treatment	
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effect	 is	 underestimated	 by	 an	 ordinary	 probit	model	where	 the	 selection	 bias	 is	 not	
considered.	 Taking	 this	 into	 account	 in	 the	 treatment	 effect	model,	 the	 coefficient	 on	
smartvote	 use	 is	 positive	 and	 significant,	 indicating	 that	 those	 voters	 who	 used	
smartvote	 prior	 to	 the	 elections	 had	 a	 higher	 probability	 to	 switch	 their	 vote	 choice	
compared	to	non‐users.	All	confounders	in	the	model	are	significant	and	point	towards	
the	 expected	 direction.	 Although	 this	 looks	 great	 in	 terms	 of	 modeling	 the	 inherent	
selection	bias,	treatment	effect	models	have	one	major	drawback.		
We	make	strong	assumptions	when	using	such	models.	Specifically,	we	assume	a	 joint	
bivariate	distribution	of	the	error	terms	(of	the	latent	selection	model	and	the	outcome	
equation)	 (Morgan	 and	 Winship	 2007:	 185).	 In	 treatment	 effect	 models,	 correct	
specification	of	 the	model	 is	 therefore	essential	 for	ensuring	that	 the	estimates	we	get	
from	the	model	are	not	biased.	A	way	to	check	 for	 this	 is	 to	run	a	Murphy’s	score	test	
(Murphy	2007,	Chiburis	2010)	to	test	the	goodness	of	 fit	of	 the	bivariate	probit	model	
and	test	whether	the	model	assumptions	are	indeed	satisfied.	According	to	the	Murphy’s	
score	 test,	 our	 model	 is	 misspecified	 (chi2(9)=19.9,	 p<0.05).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
bivariate	normal	distribution	of	the	error	terms	in	our	equations	does	not	hold.	It	is	well	
known	 that	 the	 Heckman	 treatment	 effect	 model	 is	 extremely	 sensitive	 to	
misspecifications	 (Guo	and	Fraser	2010:	124)	 since	 it	makes	very	 strong	assumptions	
about	 the	model	properties	 to	begin	with.	 If	 the	model	 is	misspecified,	 the	results	 can	
again	be	biased	(ibid.).	According	to	Chiburis	et	al.	(2011),	a	way	around	the	assumption	
of	jointly	normal	error	terms	in	bivariate	probit	models	is	using	two‐stage	least	squares	
instrumental	 variable	 (IV)	 estimation	 instead.	 In	 IV	 estimation,	 we	 need	 to	 find	 a	
variable	or	variables	that	affect	selection	into	treatment	but	not	the	outcome	of	interest	
(Guo	 and	 Fraser	 2010:	 99).	 Instrumental	 variable	 estimation	 is	 useful	 if	 the	 bivariate	
probit	model	is	misspecified	because	this	method	does	not	rely	on	joint	normality	of	the	
disturbances	 (Greene	 2008:	 893).	 In	 two‐stage	 least	 squares,	 we	 use	 the	 exogenous	
instruments	 to	 predict	 our	 endogenous	 variable	 in	 the	 model	 and	 substitute	 the	
predicted	 values	 for	 the	 actual	 value	 of	 the	 endogenous	 regressor	 in	 the	 outcome	
equation	(Wooldridge	2002:	484).	In	doing	so,	we	eliminate	the	part	of	the	endogenous	
variable	that	might	be	correlated	with	the	error	term.	Similar	to	the	Heckman	models,	IV	
is	used	when	we	 face	problems	of	omitted	or	unknown	control	variables	 (Angrist	and	
Pischke	 2009:	 84).	 Since	we	 have	 a	misspecified	 bivariate	 probit	model,	we	will	 now	
apply	the	IV	approach	to	our	example.			
In	our	example,	we	know	that	education,	income	and	gender	do	not	affect	the	likelihood	
for	 swing	 voting	 but	 are	 significant	 predictors	 of	 smartvote	 use.	Hence,	we	will	 run	 a	
two‐stage	least	squares	IV	analysis	on	our	model,	where	education,	income	and	gender	
will	 serve	as	exogenous	 instruments	(model	2).	At	 the	same	time,	as	a	comparison	we	
are	running	a	regular	OLS	regression	where	smartvote	use	is	not	instrumented	(model	
1).	Here	are	the	results	(see	Table	C.):	
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Table	C.	The	effect	of	smartvote	use	on	the	probability	for	swing	voting	–	linear	versus	
two‐stage	least	squares	regression	
	 Model	1 Model	2	
	 OLS IV	
	 swing swing	
	 	
used	smartvote	 0.13*** 0.21***	
	 (0.02) (0.04)	
multiple	vote	propensities	 0.09*** 0.07***	
	 (0.02) (0.02)	
party	attachment	 ‐0.13*** ‐0.12***	
	 (0.01) (0.01)	
left	 ‐0.06*** ‐0.07***	
	 (0.02) (0.02)	
right	 ‐0.07*** ‐0.08***	
	 (0.02) (0.02)	
age	 ‐0.00*** ‐0.00**	
	 (0.00) (0.00)	
constant	 	0.40*** 		0.33***	
	 (0.03) (0.05)	
	 	
Observations	 4,463 4,147	
R‐squared	 0.08 0.07	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
	
Instrumenting	smartvote	use	yields	a	significant	effect	of	using	the	tool	on	swing	voting.	
The	nice	thing	about	two‐stage	least	squares	estimation	is	that	we	can	test	the	validity	of	
the	instruments	used.	In	our	model,	the	Hansen	test	for	overidentification	restrictions	is	
non‐significant	 (chi2(9)=6.4	 p>0.1),	 indicating	 that	 we	 used	 valid	 instruments	 in	 the	
model.	 The	 Hausman	 endogeneity	 test	 reveals	 that	 the	 retrieved	 IV	 estimates	 differ	
significantly	 from	 the	 regular	 OLS	 estimates	 (chi2(1)=5.6,	 p<0.05),	 thus	 we	 should	
follow	the	IV	estimates	since	they	are	more	consistent.	If	we	compare	the	IV	results	to	a	
regular	 OLS	 estimation,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 “true”	 coefficient	 on	 smartvote	 use	 is	 59%	
bigger6.	
Although	linear	instrumental	variables	are	an	alternative	to	the	bivariate	probit	model	if	
the	latter	is	misspecified,	the	effects	we	measure	are	somewhat	different	from	the	ones	
we	 measure	 in	 treatment	 effect	 models.	 IV	 estimation	 consistently	 estimates	 what	
Imbens	 and	 Angrist	 (1994)	 called	 the	 Local	 Average	 Treatment	 Effect	 (LATE),	 while	
bivariate	probit	models	produce	 the	Average	Treatment	Effect	 (ATE)	and	 the	Average	
Treatment	Effect	on	the	Treated	(ATT)	(Chiburis	2011:	3).	ATE	gives	us	the	causal	effect	
																																																								
	
6	 In	 using	 this	 approach,	 we	 disregard	 the	 binary	 structure	 of	 our	 dependent	 variables,	 a	 common	
approach	 for	 estimating	 causal	 effects	 that	 are	misspecified	 in	 bivariate	 probit	models	 (Chiburis	 et	 al.	
2011:	2).		
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of	the	treatment	from	a	randomly	drawn	individual	in	the	population	whereas	ATT	gives	
us	 the	 causal	 effect	 of	 the	 treatment	 on	 a	 randomly	 drawn	 individual	 who	 actually	
received	 the	 treatment	 (Morton	 and	 Williams	 2010:	 95).	 LATE	 measures	 the	 causal	
effect	of	the	treatment	for	those	in	the	sample	that	comply	with	the	treatment,	for	those	
“whose	treatment	status	can	be	changed	by	the	instrument”	(Angrist	and	Pischke	2009:	
114).	 Therefore,	 the	 estimators	 from	 both	 models	 likely	 differ	 since	 they	 are	 not	
measuring	 the	 same	 treatment	 effect	 (Angrist	 1991).	 In	 our	 example,	 the	 Average	
Treatment	Effect	 in	 the	bivariate	probit	 treatment	effect	model	 is	 .20	and	 the	Average	
Treatment	Effect	for	the	Treated	.21,	thus	similar	to	the	IV	estimate	of	.21.	
	
The	main	challenges	
The	 issue	of	selection	bias	 in	observational	data	on	VAA	research	can	be	overcome	by	
either	 testing	 the	 results	 in	 experimental	 settings	 or	 by	 applying	 adequate	 statistical	
techniques	 that	 take	 the	 selection	bias	 explicitly	 into	account.	Although	 labeled	as	 the	
golden	standard,	experimental	settings	also	often	suffer	from	a	lack	of	representativity	
with	regard	to	the	actual	population	of	interest	(cf.	Morton	and	Williams	2010).	Ideally,	
the	 experiment	would	 be	 conducted	 among	 a	 representative	 sample	 of	 the	 electorate,	
since	we	are	interested	in	the	effects	of	the	VAA	on	voters.	More	often	than	not,	however,	
students	are	recruited	for	experimental	research,	limiting	the	explanatory	power	of	the	
results	to	the	sample	at	hand.	Hence,	selection	biases	also	occur	in	experiments,	either	
induced	 through	 the	 researcher	 or	 through	 those	 willing	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
experiment	 (self‐selection	 into	 the	 sample)	 (Guo	 and	 Fraser	 2010:	 90).	 The	 main	
advantage	of	experiments	 is,	however,	 that	random	treatment	assignment	satisfies	 the	
ignorability	 of	 treatment	 assumption	 and	 confident	 causal	 claims	 can	 be	 made	 –	
bounded	 to	 the	 selected	 sample.	 Outside	 of	 the	 experimental	 setting,	 the	 statistical	
means	to	correct	for	selection	bias	basically	try	to	create	a	situation	where	we	also	end	
up	with	ignorability	of	treatment	assignment,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	we	have	no	control	
over	who	ends	up	in	our	treatment	condition	or	sample	and	who	does	not.		
In	 establishing	 this	 scenario,	 the	 challenge	 lies	 in	 modeling	 a	 theoretically	 sound	
selection	process	and	naturally	a	theoretically	sound	outcome	equation	of	interest.	Only	
then	 can	we	 be	 confident	 that	 our	 improvement	 techniques	 actually	 did	 improve	 our	
results.	Since	more	often	than	not	we	have	to	rely	on	assumptions	about	the	causes	of	
the	selection	process,	difficulties	remain.	If	the	selection	process	remains	a	mystery,	an	
adequate	way	around	 the	endogeneity	problem	would	be	 to	 find	 suitable	 instruments	
that	highly	predict	VAA	use	but	are	unrelated	 to	any	 subsequent	behavior	 induced	by	
the	tool.	
Not	 only	 is	 adequately	 modeling	 the	 selection	 process	 a	 difficult	 task,	 but	 the	 model	
itself	 also	has	 some	obstacles	 in	 store.	 In	order	 to	make	use	of	 the	 information	 in	 the	
error	terms	of	our	equations	of	interest,	strong	assumptions	are	made	about	the	nature	
of	the	joint	distribution	of	those	error	terms.	Hence,	selection	and	treatment	models	are	
16	
	
sensitive	 to	 model	 misspecifications,	 which	 need	 to	 be	 tested	 after	 the	 estimation	
procedure	(Greene	2008:	891,	Guo	and	Fraser	2010:124).		
The	models	used	in	this	paper	give	a	first	impression	of	how	selection	biases	need	to	be	
taken	 into	 account	 in	 VAA	 research,	 but	 still	 give	 much	 room	 for	 improvement.	 The	
effect	 of	 smartvote	 use,	 for	 example,	 might	 very	 likely	 vary	 depending	 on	 personal	
characteristic	 of	 users.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 next	 step,	 the	 conditionality	 of	 effects	 need	 to	 be	
tackled.	 Since	 we	 simultaneously	 measure	 two	 equations	 with	 common	 variables	 in	
Heckman	models,	the	interpretation	of	the	effects	are	more	challenging	than	in	ordinary	
regression	 or	 logit/probit	 models.	 As	 soon	 as	 there	 is	 a	 selection	 bias	 (ρ≠0)	 and	 a	
predictor	 appears	 in	 both	 equations,	 then	we	 get	 both	 a	 direct	 effect	 and	 an	 indirect	
effect	of	 the	predictor,	where	both	have	 to	be	 taken	 into	account	when	calculating	 the	
marginal	effects	in	bivariate	probit	models	(Greene	2008:	885).	Adding	interactions	into	
the	equations	thus	makes	the	interpretation	of	the	effects	even	more	difficult.	For	now,	
we	have	ample	reason	to	assume	that	we	need	to	control	 for	 the	selection	mechanism	
when	we	analyze	effects	of	VAA	use,	since	the	consistent	 IV	estimate	of	smartvote	use	
yields	 significantly	 different	 results	 than	we	would	 obtain	without	 controlling	 for	 the	
selection	bias.	
	
Conclusion	
Choices	 are	 always	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 modeling	 any	 kind	 of	 social	 behavior.	 What	 we	
usually	end	up	observing	is	whether	an	individual	decided	for	either	A	or	B,	but	how	this	
decision	came	about	generally	remains	hidden.	It	is	exactly	this	process	of	arriving	at	the	
final	observed	decision	that	is	essential	if	we	are	to	compare	groups	of	individuals	based	
on	the	decision	they	have	taken.	If	we	are	aware	of	the	underlying	process	leading	up	to	
a	 decision,	we	 can	make	 sure	 to	 observe	 it	 and	 control	 for	 it	whenever	we	make	 the	
comparison.	But	if	that	underlying	process	is	obscure,	other	steps	need	to	be	taken	if	we	
want	to	make	valid	claims.		
In	VAA	research,	we	are	generally	interested	in	whether	the	information	provided	by	the	
tool	 has	 any	 influence	 on	 people’s	 political	 decisions	 or	 attitudes	 and	 if	 so	 to	 what	
extent.	The	data	gathered	through	observational	studies	faces	two	challenges	for	making	
any	 statements	 about	 these	 questions:	 first,	 even	 if	 we	 conduct	 a	 survey	 among	 a	
random	 population	 sample,	 individuals	 in	 the	 sample	 who	 have	 made	 use	 of	 VAA	
services	have	decided	to	do	so	out	of	several	reasons	which	likely	distinguish	them	from	
non‐users.	 Second,	 surveys	 conducted	 among	 VAA	 users	 are	 generally	 non‐
representative	 since	we	 do	 not	 know	 the	 population.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	we	 are	 dealing	
with	 selection	 into	 treatment	 whereas	 in	 the	 second	 case	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	 both	
selection	 into	 treatment	 and	 selection	 into	 the	 sample.	 As	 soon	 as	we	 have	 reason	 to	
believe	that	these	selection	processes	are	linked	to	an	outcome	of	interest,	the	task	is	to	
take	these	selection	biases	into	account.	If	we	do	not	do	this,	standard	techniques	such	
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as	OLS	or	logit/probit	will	give	us	inaccurate	estimates	from	which	we	draw	inaccurate	
conclusions	(Sartori	2003).		
In	this	paper,	we	tried	to	illustrate	this	problem	on	a	concrete	example	from	Swiss	VAA	
data.	 We	 were	 interested	 to	 see	 whether	 smartvote	 users	 who	 were	 affected	 by	 the	
voting	 recommendation	 in	 their	 vote	 choice	were	more	 inclined	 to	 change	 their	 vote	
choice	at	the	polls	and	whether	smartvote	users	in	general,	compared	to	non‐users,	had	
a	higher	probability	for	swing	voting	in	the	last	Swiss	federal	elections.	In	trying	to	take	
the	selection	biases	into	account	in	our	models,	our	results	indicate	that	smartvote	use	
does	indeed	have	an	effect	on	users	vote	choice.			
As	 the	 example	has	demonstrated,	modeling	 the	 selection	bias	 is	 a	daunting	 task.	Not	
only	do	we	have	to	make	reasonable	assumptions	about	a	process	of	which	we	do	not	
actually	know	much	about	but	we	are	also	faced	with	strong	model	assumptions	that	can	
leave	us	strayed.	Especially	in	models	where	not	only	the	selection	but	also	the	outcome	
of	interest	is	binary	such	as	in	our	examples,	arriving	at	a	jointly	normal	distribution	of	
the	error	terms	is	hard	to	satisfy.	Essentially,	the	challenge	for	future	research	is	to	find	
better	 explanations	 for	why	 individuals	 end	 up	 choosing	 to	 use	 VAAs	 or,	 even	 better,	
find	 adequate	 instruments	 that	 highly	 predict	 VAA	 use	 but	 are	 unassociated	 with	
political	 choices	 and	 attitudes.	 For	 now,	 awareness	 of	 the	 outlined	 techniques	 and	
applying	 them	 to	 the	analysis	of	observational	data	 should	become	a	 standard	 task	 in	
research	on	VAA’s	and	their	impact	on	electoral	behavior.		
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Appendix	
A. Variable	Descriptives	
	 Heckman	
selection	
model	
Heckman	
treatment	
effect	
model	
(bivariate	
probit)	
	
IV	model
Observations	 5895/2481 4067 4147
Variable	 	mean	 mean mean Scale
Swing	voting	 0.32	 0.32 0.32 Dummy	(1=	swing	voter,	
0=stable	voter)	
Smartvote	use	 0.42	 0.63 0.64 Dummy	(1=user,	0=non‐user)
Multiple	vote	propensities 0.52	 0.65 0.66 Dummy	(1=multiple,	0=non‐
multiple)	
Party	attachment	 0.49	 0.58 0.58 Dummy (1=attached,	0=not
attached)	
Left	 0.35	 0.43 0.43 Dummy	(1=left	of	the	political	
spectrum,	0=reference	group	
center)	
Right	 0.38	 0.25 0.25 Dummy	(1=right	of	the	political	
spectrum,	=reference	group	
center)	
Age	 48	 47.5 47.5 Continuous	(18‐96)	
Education	 2.9	 3.2 3.2 Dummy	(5	categories	into	4	
dummies)	
Income	 4.1	 4.4 4.4 Dummy	(6	categories	into	5	
dummies)	
Gender	 0.42	 0.33 0.33 Dummy	(1=female,	0=male)
Homepage	visit	 0.21	 0.28 Dummy	(1=yes,	0=no)	
	
	
	
